Unsound Seeds by Rehding, Alexander
14 Unsound Seeds
alexander rehding
In the wax museums and anatomical display cabinets of speculative
sideshow owners there are certain sections that are hung with curtains
bearing the words ‘Admission for adults only’ or ‘customers with weak
nerves are warned not to visit this room’ and that contain somemonstrosity
as the actual main attraction of the otherwise very harmless collections.1
With this image of a curtain hiding and at the same time heightening some
terrible secret, Max Kalbeck began his review of the first Viennese perform-
ance of Richard Strauss’s Salome. TheodorW. Adorno picked up the image
of the curtain in the context of Strauss’s fabled skill at composing non-
musical events, when he identified the opening flourish of Strauss’s Salome
as the swooshing sound of the rising curtain.2 If this is so, the succès de
scandale of the opera was achieved, in more than one sense, as soon as the
curtain rose at Dresden’s Semperoper on 10 December 1905.
Critics of the premiere noted that the opera set ‘boundless wildness and
degeneration to music’; it brought ‘high decadence’ onto the operatic stage;
a ‘composition of hysteria’, reflecting the ‘disease of our time’, Salome is
‘hardly music any more’.3 The outrage did not end there. A few months
after the premiere the ageing Felix Draeseke published the polemic
Confusion in Music, in which he analysed the phenomenon of Salome
and the culture that allowed this to happen.4 Embracing a Spenglerian
cultural pessimism, Draeseke dwelt on the widespread fears that we had
reached the end of music as we know it. Piquantly, Draeseke could hardly
be counted as conservative; rather, as a member of the nineteenth-century
Fortschrittspartei around Liszt and Wagner, he had garnered impeccable
progressive credentials. Draeseke’s polemic in turn encouraged other
critics to add their views on Salome and the state of contemporary music
in general, and soon a sizeable – and surprisingly coherent – body of
This chapter is dedicated to Eric Zakim, with thanks for the countless discussions on musical
degeneracy.
1 Kalbeck 1990, 336–42. 2 Adorno 1966, 115n.
3 Brandes 1905, 1291; Gräner 1905, 437; Brandes 1905, 1293; Gräner 1905, 439, 438. Translations
are my own, except where otherwise noted. See also Messmer 1989.
4 Shigihara 1990 offers a useful anthology of early responses to Salome. 303
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mostly conservative music criticism emerged that diagnosed the ills befall-
ing the patient that was music.
This medical metaphor is no coincidence. A biological, or rather vita-
listic, model of the musical work and music history informed most critics’
observations and conclusions. One of the respondents, Hugo Riemann,
spelled out what this debate was really about when he foregrounded the
catchphrase of degeneration in the debate. This term had been loosely
bandied about right from the very outset of the critical responses to the
opera, but it was left to Riemann to thematise this term in his polemic
‘Degeneration and Regeneration’.5 Pseudo-scientific terminology was all
the rage in turn-of-the-century music criticism, and a scintillating term
such as degeneration, borrowed as it was from the unholy trinity of nine-
teenth-century criminal pathology, evolutionary biology and social
Darwinism, thrived on overtones of scientific precision – so much so that
it seemed unnecessary to define the term in any greater detail. The identi-
fication of degenerate elements of music, fantastical as the whole enterprise
was, promised the possibility not only of objectively analysing a cultural
situation but also appeared to suggest ways to cure music of its ills. We
should therefore raise the curtain of Salome once again, a century later, to
get a sense of how the critical discourse of musical degeneracy was elabo-
rated around that most scandalous of Strauss’s operas.
***
But wait. It would not be in the spirit of the culture of degeneracy,
characterised as it is by excess, licentiousness and luxuriousness, that we
jump into a discussion in medias res. What follows is less an analysis of
Strauss’s score than a reconstruction of the broader discourse of musical
degeneracy that will, somewhat self-indulgently, weave in and out of the
critical and analytical commentary surrounding Strauss’s scandal-ridden
opera, behind which, needless to say, Wagner’s long and dark shadow
always looms large. The battle-cry of ‘degeneracy’ functions, in many ways,
as a conduit metaphor, as a term whose very pronouncement unlocks a
certain mode of thinking. The utterance of ‘degeneracy’ forcefully steers
associations in one particular direction and opens up a force field leading
irresistibly into the powerful realm of cultural pessimism.
What, then, is cultural degeneracy? The bare-bones history of degenera-
tion can be told relatively swiftly: originally developed as a physiological
concept in mid-nineteenth-century France, the medical term
5 Riemann 1908; reprinted in Shigihara 1990, 245–9.
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dégénérescence is primarily associated with Bénédict Morel, who was inter-
ested in the hereditary qualities of organic abnormalities. In the public
imagination this concept soon extended to the larger social body of the
nation, mixing it with racial theories, above all Arthur de Gobineau’s essay
on the inequality of races. Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso picked up
Morel’s concept and applied it to his study of hereditary criminality. In
Lombroso’s hands degeneration became synonymous with ‘atavistic
regression’, the return to a previous evolutionary stage (which, in the
context of the nineteenth-century ideology of progress, fed directly into
major cultural fears). It was Max Nordau, finally, who transferred the
concept entirely to the study of culture in his vastly popular study
Entartung (1892), dedicated to Lombroso. Nordau’s Entartung, an inter-
national bestseller, was a thundering diatribe, dressed up in scientific garb,
against contemporary artistic movements and cultural heroes of the age,
including Tolstoy, Ibsen, Nietzsche, Zola and above all Wagner.6
For our purposes, degeneracy is best understood as perennial negation, a
brightly flashing ‘Un-’ slapped in front of whatever organic or moral
authority one may want to invoke: unnatural, unhealthy, unwholesome,
unviable, untenable, untrustworthy, impure, immoral, incorrect, dishon-
ourable, corrupt, contagious, dangerous. It is this slippage that makes the
concept so powerful. The epistemological idea on which cultural degen-
eracy thrives, and which makes this slippage possible, inverts Spinoza’s
principle of omnis determinatio negatio est (‘every definition is negation’).
No longer does a series of progressive negations lead to one positive
definition, but here only the negation – degeneration – is given, encoura-
ging the reader to infer the implied positives. This opens up enormous
interpretative scope. In combination with the clear and present danger that
is assumed to emanate from degenerate objects or processes, it is not
difficult to see how withholding the positive answer while dangling the
sensationally toxic negative in front of our eyes (or ears) will lead to the
kinds of behaviour psychoanalysts describe as neurotic.
Breathing Life into Music
Before musical scientists could apply their cultural stethoscopes on music’s
body and pronounce the chilling diagnosis of degeneration over it, indeed,
before music could even stretch out on the doctor’s examination table, the
6 Pick 1989.
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patient first had to have received the kiss of life. This was by no means self-
evident, as the notion of music as an organism would have been quite
unthinkable before the massive intellectual and social transformations of
the 1800s.7 It fell to the romantic generation to breathe life into music and
to endow it with aesthetic autonomy and vital functions in one fell swoop.8
Like other newly vivified fellow organisms – labour, language and love9 –
this warm and pulsating music became a force to be reckoned with.
The theologically inspired philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause,
for one, proclaimed in 1831 that ‘music itself is determinate life, and it
represents the full life of emotions in its peculiar life, in the life of tones’.10
Krause was too precise an analytical thinker to let himself get away with the
conflation between the two conditions he assigned to music: music was
both considered to be the metaphorical analogue of life, and to be a living
organism in its own right. As this pesky difference between metaphor and
essence, however, hampered the full flourishing of the grand metaphysical
systems that the romantics were busy constructing around the idea of
music, it quickly fell by the wayside.
Over the last 200 years it has become such an ingrained part of talking
about music to think of the history of music as an evolution of musical
styles or as a series of works that engender one another in a cogent, indeed
necessary succession, that the notion of music not only ‘representing life’
but ‘being life’ has created a reality for itself.11 Even nowadays, while most
of us would deny that music has a ‘life’ in any biologically meaningful
sense, far fewer object to historical accounts of music in terms of budding,
flourishing, birth, maturity or death.
At the risk of stating the obvious: despite music’s newly gained identity
as a life-force in its own right, the problem with this ‘life’ of music is that a
composition still had to be created by a composer before it could exist.
(Scholars beholden to the Idealist tradition sometimes seem to play down
this problem by acknowledging that music’s autonomy is only ‘relative’
and otherwise to ignore the vast consequences of this fact.)12 Of course,
referring to musical creations themselves in humanising terms was com-
mon practice. Even in the 1910s, Ferruccio Busoni and Hans Pfitzner still
7 The famous chapter nineteen of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Language
– titled ‘How music has degenerated’ – is a rare exception. See Rousseau 2009.
8 See, among many others, Chua 1999. 9 See Foucault 1971.
10 Krause 1839, 19. The unfinished, posthumously published manuscript was written in 1831 but
is based on lectures Krause gave between 1824 and 1829.
11 For an impressive analysis of evolution and progress in music historical texts, see Allen 1953.
12 See Dahlhaus 1989.
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quibbled about what exactly it meant for music to be described as an
‘infant’, though no one doubted the veracity of this image.13 It had
become much more than a mere metaphor. But even if one believed, as
did Pfitzner, that in his day music had grown up to become a strapping –
German – lad, an important difference remained: composers could create
musical compositions, which could then live on as autonomous works,
but, put bluntly, no musical work has ever been reported giving birth to a
composer.
In the context of Darwinism this was actually a serious scholarly discus-
sion. In 1900, Oswald Koller made a sustained attempt to transfer the
principles of sexual selection to music history. For him, the musical
organism was always ‘the product of two factors’, effectively its two genetic
parents: it carried the general traits of its age, ‘style’, which Koller gendered
as paternal, and the particular traits of its creator, ‘individuality’, which
carried maternal traits.14 The reason for his gendered choice was that the
composer is the ‘receptacle’ of traditions from generations past, whereas
‘present circumstances’ constitute the fertilising elements. Koller was
aware that these dual influences, one personal and the other historical
and interpersonal, were qualitatively different from biological parents. He
nonetheless tried to push the simile as far as he possibly could: ‘Every new
work has a fertilising effect not only for contemporaries and descendants,
but also on its creator himself.’15 We need not buy into Koller’s exuberant,
and sometimes tortured, attempt to argue away the asymmetry between
composer and work, to see how important this biologistic strain of think-
ing was at the turn of the century.
It was precisely this asymmetry that Krause had originally articulated in
his distinction between ‘representing life’ and ‘being life’. The asymmet-
rical relation between composer-as-creator and work-as-autonomous-
organism added an awkward level of complication in the genealogies of
musical evolution. The two formed two strands in a lopsided double helix
of an evolutionary music history that had a habit of tying themselves in
knots which were difficult to disentangle.
***
13 See Busoni 1916. Music is described as a young child starting on p. 7. And see Pfitzner’s
Futuristengefahr (1917), reprinted in H. Pfitzner 1926, 185–223. The image of music as a
growing boy is found on p. 193.
14 Koller 1901, 40. This was hardly a singular occurrence: similar attempts are found in other
European contexts, such as in the work of Jules Combarieu in France, and Edmund Gurney in
England.
15 Koller 1901, 41.
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In a world where music was a life form, music history had to solve its own
chicken-and-egg problem: composer and work became so inextricably
joined that music history was running the risk of turning into biography.
Few music historians were as clear-sighted as Franz Stoepel, who took the
most radical, and admirably logical, step in solving this problem by strictly
uncoupling the history of music from that of musicians, presenting both in
separate sections of his Grundzüge der Geschichte der modernen Musik
(1821).16 More commonly, only one side was foregrounded. Or both were
conflated, as Guido Adler prescribed in his foundational methodology for
musicology: the purpose of music history is to understand ‘the develop-
mental process of music in works and their creators’17 where all differences
between these two aspects are brushed aside.
The problem leading to Adler’s indifference can be traced back right to
the earliest scholarly music histories written on the continent in the 1830s.
The German music historian Raphael Georg Kiesewetter led the way along
the road to the great-man history of music. He rejected any division of
music history according to world-historical periods, or stylistic periods, in
favour of epochs named after outstanding composers, as the ‘most natural
order’, offering ‘the most reliable survey’. The composers that gave their
name to their age were those who had ‘left the greatest imprint on the
creation of art and the taste of their contemporaries and . . . evidently
advanced art to a higher degree of perfection’.18
His equally influential Belgian colleague and vociferous opponent
François-Joseph Fétis, meanwhile, moved away from the figure of the
composer and concentrated on the gradual unfolding of the potential
inherent in the scalar material. Fétis recounted his creed: ‘I believed . . .
in one scale given by nature as the basis of all music.’19 The grand system
Fétis had created in his concepts of the progression of stages of tonality,
from unitonique to omnitonique, predicting the completion and demise of
tonality was the closest music theory should come to a morphology of
music history.
At face value, Fétis and Kiesewetter seem poles apart, and the extensive
polemics between them, first and foremost about the nature of tonality,
only serve to confirm this impression. (It might be tempting to construe
this polarity in terms of differences between Francophone and Germanic
cultures, but the Idealist Fétis considered himself intellectually an out-
and-out German.)20 Below the polemical surface, however, the
16 Stoepel 1821. 17 Adler 1919, 13. 18 Kiesewetter 1834, 10. 19 Fétis 1869, 1:i.
20 See Schelhous 1991.
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historiographical basis of each can accommodate the tenets of the other.
Kiesewetter in fact also conceived of music as an abstract evolving force
shaped by composers, whose principles can be captured by a system of rules.
Thus, in Kiesewetter’s view, the Greeks had fundamentally misunderstood
this system, as they had not understood harmony and polyphony – as a
consequence, their ‘amiable’musical child was stillborn.21 And Fétis, whose
first major work was, not coincidentally, a Universal Biography of Musicians
(1835–44), held fast to the belief that each new stage of tonality was ushered
in by one great composer: Monteverdi, Mozart and – much to Fétis’s
annoyance – Berlioz.
The difference between Kiesewetter’s biographical and Fétis’s struc-
tural approaches, then, turns out to be one of degree, or rather of
hierarchy: are composers determined (or constrained) by the ‘state of
the musical material’, or do they, conversely, determine (or control) this
state? Their answers determined how they viewed the problem of degen-
eration: as Fétis argued, ‘the greatest composers, whose genius was
determined by the nature of the harmonic elements that they had at
their disposition, could not extract themselves from the rigid despotism
of this tonal unity’.22 Kiesewetter, who in 1834 did not believe that
music’s time was up yet, would hold against this attitude that ‘wherever
art decayed, it decayed at the hands of the artist’.23
More generally, the dichotomy between Kiesewetter and Fétis repre-
sented opposite responses to the problem of understanding the cause and
nature of progress. This great blank in the historical understanding in the
nineteenth century was usually filled with the figure of the creative genius.
No matter what role was assigned to the genius – whether it consisted in
being a godlike ‘second maker’ (Shaftesbury), in giving ‘nature’s rule to art’
(Kant), or in representing the manifestation of the world spirit (Hegel) –
the genius was designated the virtually ubiquitous placeholder in art and
the history of art.24 The role of the genius was to bring individual achieve-
ment into alignment with the notion of a pre-ordained plan of the whole.
However conceived, the concept of the genius managed to fill the gaping
hole between the startling phenomenon that some individuals were
responsible for historical deeds or new artworks, often in a haphazard
and apparently meaningless way, and the comforting thought that (music)
history would unfold in a logical underlying progression, even if its course
was not always immediately apparent. With this sleight-of-hand, the
21 Kiesewetter 1834, 1. 22 Fétis 1849, 151. 23 Kiesewetter 1834, 100.
24 For a useful survey of the genius concept, see Schmidt 1985.
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contention that music ‘represented life’ (was a creation) and simulta-
neously ‘was life’ (was a creature, an organism) in its own right, convinced
generations of musical thinkers at all levels.
By means of the genius, then, the awkward problem of music’s compro-
mised autogenetic prowess – its ‘relative autonomy’ – could be solved in an
elegant way: the composer would become something that was both mother
and midwife in a creative process that was at liberty to transgress certain
rules with impunity. If lesser spirits were to commit them, these transgres-
sions would have to be considered offences, but the genius was a seal of
approval, vouchsafing compliance with the dictates of nature or history.
Appealing to the genius implied no less than a leap of faith across this
divide between ‘representing life’ and ‘being life’.
***
The genius was designated to close this epistemological gap: he would
create innovative works, it was asserted, of unprecedented exemplary
quality.25 As these works followed the exigencies of nature, their startling
newness notwithstanding, the succession of these works would constitute
a cogent historical narrative describing the gradual and inevitable evolu-
tion of music. Thus the unity of individual aesthetic value and general
historical narrative could be preserved seamlessly. In this way, the genius
and his works would simultaneously reaffirm a whole string of idealist
beliefs: the equation between beauty and truth, progress and perfection,
and ultimately the meaning of history as a succession of autonomous
artworks.
The admiration the genius elicited from the masses or posterity was
taken as the token of the unimpeachable moral quality of these works, and
the educational value of a history constituted of such works. But what if the
genius was not the shining beacon he was thought to be? The free rein the
genius had been granted came under increasing scrutiny, as these idealist
certainties fell apart in the nineteenth century. Scepticism was not unwar-
ranted: if direct knowledge of the workings of nature or history was
foreclosed to lesser individuals, that is, most of us, how could one know
that the genius was not leading us astray? The story of degeneration in
music can be understood as an expression of this suspicion.
Immanuel Kant wrote a note of caution into his influential reflections
on genius: ‘But since [the genius] also can produce original nonsense, its
products must be models, i.e. exemplary; and they consequently ought
25 I consciously use masculine pronouns for the genius. See Battersby 1989.
310 alexander rehding
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316275863.015
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Cambridge Centre of International Studies, on 10 Oct 2021 at 14:50:06, subject to the Cambridge
not to spring from imitation, but must serve as a standard or rule of
judgment for others.’26 Kant was blithely unconcerned about the wider
ramifications of this point; for him the problem of nonsense was a closed
system in its own right: nonsense would be recognised either by not
being original or, retroactively, by its inability to have given ‘nature’s
rule to art’ – that is, nonsense would not function as a model and would
not produce artistic progeny. The proof, for Kant, was in the pudding,
and the problem of nonsense would automatically take care of itself.
Later commentators, by contrast, were not convinced that original
nonsense could never become a model. This thought would become
one of the main fears within the discourse of degeneracy: What if art
was following false idols, and unknowingly strayed from the path of good
art? How would we even know we are on the right track? What is the
difference between good, ‘healthy’ originality, and nonsensical innova-
tion? As we will see, a number of critics of degeneration would invest a lot
of energy trying to find ways to discriminate between true geniuses and
false idols.
Insofar as the discourse of musical degeneration never questions the ‘life’
of music (and could not possibly do so) it partakes of the very idealist
convictions that it claims to examine with scientific impartiality. It is here
that we return to our dual approach to the phenomenon of degeneration as,
on the one hand, the attempt to elevate cultural pessimism onto a scientific
pedestal, and on the other, a fictionalisation of science in the service of
upholding these cherished idealist values. Nomatter what biological model
we discover underlying approaches to degeneration, and no matter what
intellectual expressions we determine as requirements – physiognomy,
Spencerianism, etc. – the constant factor between all of them is the con-
viction that some invisible underlying state of culture can be read out of
artistic products. The signs of artistic decay are invariably read as symp-
toms of something much bigger. The relation between the composer and
his creation is central to this concern, as we shall see, and it determines the
way in which degeneration is imagined.
In the following, we will explore three of these main lines in which
musical degeneration has been imagined, using Strauss’s Salome as a
reference point. First, if the work of art is imagined as a fully autonomous
entity that exists independently of its creator and creates its own historical
trajectory then degeneration may set in with a fault in the ‘genetic code’ of
the work of music. The consequences, the argument continues, will be felt
26 See also Lewis 2005.
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in subsequent generations if the evolution of such work strays away from a
healthy development and leads in the wrong direction. (Underlying this
construction is invariably a tacit conviction that a ‘right’ direction exists.)
Second, if the individual work of art is considered as a vehicle of moral and
sensuous pleasure, the main point of concern becomes the relationship
between surface and deep structure. The sensuous, sounding surface –
stimulating the nerves – was often seen as a danger to the spiritual content
of the work of art. Not only was the composition believed to reflect the
nervous disposition of the composer, but it could also gravely affect the
nervous state of its listeners. And third, we will return to the figure of the
genius as a surface onto which cultural fears and aspirations were
projected.
All this invests a metaphor with great power. If we have to appeal to the
laws of literature in order to understand the full power of the discourse of
degeneration, then its force is driven by the search for closure, the quest for
an ending – ideally one that is in consonance with the kind of life that
music had been assigned in the first place. For all its scientific posturing,
the discourse of degeneration is ultimately about the force of narrative.
And the tales we hear are inescapably moralising.
Evolutionary Models
The vehement critical reaction Strauss’s Salome elicited is useful from our
perspective, as it brings out the tacit critical assumptions and pedigreed
critical dogmas more clearly than in any other musical work of the time.
Both supporters and detractors of Salome were caught up in the nine-
teenth-century doctrine of organicism, in which nature metaphors
abound. One enthusiastic critic of the premiere compared the opera with
a ‘flower of the rarest, erotic kind’. He emphasised that this ‘erotic flower,’
like the opera itself, was a ‘product of nature’.27 (Intriguingly, others mis-
read the extravagant image as ‘exotic flower’.) Most other critics disagreed.
Granted that Salome was a product of nature, it was a musical organism
gone wrong:
That which blossoms and grows in the artist through nature’s touch, organises
itself according to a peculiar law, emerging together with the embryo of the work of
art, is a product of nature, almost without any human contribution. The science of
harmony, of counterpoint, the entire theory of composition exhausts itself in the
27 Hermann Boehringer, cited in Messmer 1989, 45.
312 alexander rehding
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316275863.015
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Cambridge Centre of International Studies, on 10 Oct 2021 at 14:50:06, subject to the Cambridge
focus of artistic creation and even in the slower work of elaborating, the artistic
idea imperceptibly flows back together with nature. And nature never repeats
itself.28
If there is such a ‘peculiar law’ in music, where is its embryonic seed
located? Musical thinkers were divided between the three principal ele-
ments of music: melody, rhythm and harmony. A. B. Marx, Ernst Kurth
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, albeit coming from very different perspectives,
would all appeal to the emotional force of melody. Krause, whom we
encountered earlier, found himself in the diverse company of Margaret
Glyn and Friedrich Schelling in choosing rhythm as music’s heartbeat.29
Harmony, finally, with its traditional associations with physics, was harder
to add to music’s biological functions, but it came to play a vital role
nonetheless, particularly when it came to explaining evolutionary models
of music.30
Before we return to Salome’s exotic-erotic flower, let us explore a little
further how the element of harmony was construed to unfold historically.
A favourite demonstration, something of a learned musical parlour game,
was the evolution of the Tristan chord.31 Donald Tovey, for instance,
identified the origin of Tristan’s opening, shown in Figure 14.1, as a half-
cadence with modal bent, as it might have been written during the
sixteenth century, and showed how the music evolves following a route
towards elaboration, cogently tracing the rules of voice-leading.
Tovey identified this development as an evolution from simple
harmonic progressions to advanced chromatic passages. This evolution is
an elaboration toward ever more intricate musical structures laid out over
an imagined chronology. It is tempting to imagine this entirely hypothe-
tical model as the musicological equivalent of Ernst Haeckel’s visually
stunning, and scientifically dubious, parallel tables of human evolution
(see Figure 14.2), where the developmental stages of embryos from differ-
ent species are juxtaposed, suggesting that their early stages are virtually
indistinguishable from one another, only gradually evolving into their
characteristic shape.
All this is in support of Haeckel’s highly influential and irresistibly
romantic thesis that ontogeny replicates phylogeny, that ‘the history of
28 Karl Schmalz, ‘Annus Confusionis. Eine Trilogie’, in Shigihara 1990, 282. The quotation is a
passage by the music critic Paul Marsop.
29 A. B. Marx 1884, 443; Krause 1839, 169; Glyn 1909.
30 For some pathos-ridden rhetoric see Heller 1930, 14.
31 Tovey [1911] 1944, 68. For another model see Schering [1935] 1941, 132.
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Figure 14.1 Tovey’s evolutionary model of music, from a modal turn of phrase to the
Tristan chord, from ‘Harmony’, Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911).
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the individual is the abbreviated history of the species’. He declared that the
embryonic stages of higher-evolved species correspond to the former fully
developed stages of its ancestral species – in other words, that each
individual has to undergo a fast-forwarded summary of the entire history
of evolution.32
Tovey’s model also carried the same evolutionary idea with it, where
each apparently historical stage in the evolution towards the Tristan chord
represents one stepping stone which carries all the previous stages in itself
and is in turn superseded by a more complex manifestation. Putting his
organicist cards on the table, Tovey explains his ambition to show that the
laws of harmony ‘are true to the nature of art and are no mere rules of a
game’.33 On one level, such evolutionary tables could be seen as exempli-
fications of the principle with which Adler began his programmatic expo-
sition of a stylistic history of music:
Figure 14.2 Parallel evolution of embryos from various species. From Ernst Haeckel,
Anthropogenie (1874), table iv/v.
32 See Gould 1977, 1981. 33 Tovey 1944, 44.
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The development of musical art is organic. In continuous succession one evolu-
tionary moment links up with the next to bring the organism to completion. The
individual phenomena can be viewed from different perspectives. For the purpose
of historical depiction, that which shows the phenomena in their temporal succes-
sion offers the most readily intelligible perspective.34
The unilinearity from one historical level to the next suggested in these
constructs makes an impressive plea – visually more so than aurally – for
the organic evolution of the chromatic harmony of Tristan. The Tristan
chord is shown to carry within it the whole history of Western harmony
from humble beginnings to its most complex flowering. In this representa-
tion nothing appears illogical, wilfully contrived or artificial – it follows in a
stringent progression.
The Tristan chord is, of course, not just any chord. This enigmatic
harmonic–contrapuntal complex stood emblematically for the pinnacle
of musical modernity – or the beginning of the end of harmonic tonality.35
While not explicitly claimed by either author, it is almost impossible not to
read such an evolutionary table as a powerful visual argument against the
widespread assertions that Wagner’s music constituted the main degen-
erative force in late nineteenth-century culture.36 As if to liberateWagner’s
music from the taint of fin-de-siècle decadence, Tovey addedmischievously
that Wagner’s sense of key was no different from Beethoven’s (whose
vigour and ‘health’ was never in any doubt), except carried out on a
broader temporal span.
As far as stylistic history is concerned, however, Tovey’s idea of evolu-
tion is distinctly dubious. The actual argument presented here lies in the
continuity and cogency suggested in the presentation. The historical tra-
jectory providing the explanatory logic for Wagner’s famous opening bars
is clearly constructed backwards, beginning with the Tristan opening, not
culminating in it. After all, only by means of this teleology can the
historical narration protect the work against accusations of degeneration,
real or imaginary. Like Haeckel’s example, the evolutionary progression
from modal polyphony towards Tristan is nothing but a theoretical sys-
tematisation spread out over quasi-historical instantiations, amounting to
an arbitrary succession of stylistic stages. Likewise, the assumed succession
of musical styles, progressing towards ever-clearer distinction and individ-
uality, and culminating and concentrating in a single work is a
34 Adler 1880, col. 690. 35 Kurth 1920.
36 A wonderful example is Edmund Gurney’s vividly synaesthetic description of Tristan in
‘Wagner and Wagnerism’, in Tertium Quid (1899), 2:19. See also Kennaway 2012a.
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questionable historiographical assumption, albeit one that perfectly repli-
cates the basic idea of ontogeny-as-phylogeny. In this way, the organic
work of art functions as both a representative of a distinct style and as an
autonomous living organism in its own right.
***
Unfortunately for Strauss, his critics felt that none of this applied to
Salome. According to organicist dogma, it was nature that warranted the
character of art, and in so doing nature set absolute limitations to art. The
ways in which nature apparently indicated these limitations reflected the
staples of nineteenth-century music theory: according to the critics, nature
constituted itself variously in the harmonic series, in closed forms, in the
rules of counterpoint, or indeed in the healthy sentiment of the nation.37
And Strauss seemed to fall foul of all these authorities in some respect.
The problem was identified in his colourful orchestration, his overly
refined handling of timbre, and ultimately his provenance from the
dreaded genre of programme music:
The combination of instrumental colours went hand in hand with the dissolution
of form. And colour without form?! Perhaps the germ of such sudden decay must
be sought in this untenable state [i.e. the impossibility of colours to hold up without
form]. In any case, the germ of decay was that one began alienating autonomous
music from its very own primordial essence . . .Nothing good could come of this.38
If the very own Ur-essence of music resided in autonomous forms, then
this musical essence was denied by Strauss’s composition. However,
another aspect is implied in this critic’s assessment of the situation: when
he uses the organicist metaphor of ‘the germ of decay’ he adds a historical
dimension to the argument. The germ is not merely the musical idea but an
expression of cultural pessimism. What is at stake is no less than the future
of music. From this angle, programmatic elements that Strauss composed
out in his score – such as the initial rustling of the rising curtain – become
signs of the Decline of the West.
Draeseke went one step further: in Salome ‘there are moments that
cannot be explained in purely musical terms and that I therefore cannot
assess as music’.39 Strauss had committed the cardinal sin of overstepping
the boundaries of what was considered music. A particular thorn in the
critics’ side was the double-bass solo during Jochanaan’s off-stage
37 Arno Kleffel, ‘Ueber Konfusion in der Musik’, in Shigihara 1990, 145; P. Pfitzner 1905, 903.
38 Schmalz, in Shigihara 1990, 286.
39 Felix Draeseke, ‘Offene Antwort an Richard Strauß’, in Shigihara 1990, 173.
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execution. Strauss’s performance instruction indicates: ‘Instead of pressing
down [the string], this tone is to be played by tightly holding the string
between thumb and index finger; a short sharp attack with the bow so as to
create a sound that resembles the suppressed sighing and moaning of a
woman.’40 Zooming in on this moment, one critic commented
sarcastically:
So that’s what all the fuss is about. If this entire development began by creating
means and forms that were adequate to great contents, then it ended by character-
ising possible and impossible things: in particular, music became more and more
characteristic, until it comprised the ugly and the sick . . . – and lost its character
altogether.41
Here again, degeneration of a purported musical essence is telescoped into
the historical dimension, heralding the end of music at large. The problem
of degeneration is, on one level, one of musical progress-as-procreation.
Here the metaphors of reproduction that abound in the debate – ‘erotic
flower’, ‘germ cell’, ‘embryo’ – come to full effect: after all, it is sex that is at
the core of the opera.
Non-reproductive sex, to be specific: Herod’s lust for his step-daughter,
Herodias’ sublimated desire for power, Salome’s necrophilia, Narraboth’s
masochistic longing for Salome, the little page’s homosexual feelings for
Narraboth. And behind all this, as the more reactionary critics eagerly
reminded their readers, lay the sexual perversion of playwright
Oscar Wilde.42 No surprise, then, that sexual reproduction was seen as a
danger – or as an opportunity – in the critical responses to Salome.
Ferruccio Busoni made this genealogical thought more explicit than any-
one else, albeit in unreservedly positive terms:
In art everything changes step by step. With this Salome such a step may have been
taken on the top of other manifestations which will hurry on to the ascent of a new
and higher step. Every son has the stuff of his ancestors in him – by his side flourish
a hundred other species.43
What Busoni celebrated here encapsulated the worst fears of the detractors
of Salome, for it might indeed herald no less than the end of music – at least
a music that works on the basis of triads and counterpoint and complies
with the ‘healthy sentiment of the nation’. Added to these limitations set by
nature are those from Idealist aesthetics:
40 Strauss 2009, 294. 41 Schmalz, in Shigihara 1990, 285.
42 See for instance, Adam Röder, quoted in Puffett 1989, 133. 43 Busoni in Puffett 1989, 140.
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Topics of a more or less explicitly sexual nature are nothing unusual in modern
art but rather tend to represent the norm. The limitations should not be set by
moral but by artistic interests. Sex may well find its place in rustic anecdotes and
cheap novels, in the variety show – as much as is allowed by the police, this has
nothing to do with art. From the artist, however, we demand the highest
sensitivity – not out of prudishness but for the sake of art itself. One loves to
talk about modern liberated art, which does not close off anything human or
natural. Nothing may be closed off but it closes itself off from anything that
cannot be spiritualised, anything that remains animalistic. Schiller – who will
surely be a philistine for the new composers of decadence – demarcates this
boundary by calling on the artists: ‘The dignity of humankind is laid in your
hands. It is yours to preserve!’44
This critic spelled out what others assumed tacitly: the categories on which
Salome was assessed are ultimately derived from German Idealism. While
in German philosophy the unity of goodness, truth and beauty had come
under suspicion at least since Nietzsche, this dubious triumvirate still ruled
strong in the field of music criticism (or was invoked when it seemed
convenient). Even though this Idealism had acquired a distinct Darwinian
tinge in the later nineteenth century, it was on the basis of this surviving
Idealism that several critics made a direct connection between the ethical
import of the work and its technical features.
***
Let’s take a step back from Strauss’s Salome again, to consider the wider
implications. For the conclusion that Strauss had somehow overstepped
a mark and had turned ‘good’ progress into ‘bad’ degeneration is, of
course, an arbitrary decision. Busoni’s glowing assessment has no
greater or lesser validity than the abject dismissal of the conservative
critics, and the moral dimension attached to their aesthetic judgment is,
at bottom, just as metaphorical – just as meaningful or meaningless – as
the evolutionary trajectory critics drew to bolster their respective
positions.
For an object like music, whose commentators steadfastly refuse to
decide whether it ‘represents’ life or ‘is’ life, the imagined processes of
evolution, based on graphic chains of metamorphoses, need not in princi-
ple continue in one direction only. Even the nineteenth century itself,
though overawed by the idea of evolution, knew that such graphic evidence
could easily bemanipulated. The French caricaturist J. J. Grandville latched
44 Georg Göhler, ‘Richard Strauß’, in Shigihara 1990, 212.
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on to the reversibility of these images, showing (Figure 14.3), how the
developmental chains could overshoot the goal and go the other way: from
a child, via the adult stage, and gradually metamorphose into an ape-like
brute in chains.45 It is difficult to tell whether Grandville is making a
commentary on social decline or physiological degeneration, but in nine-
teenth-century French discourse, as Daniel Pick has shown, the differences
were negligible.46 The graphic evidence documents this process of degen-
eration with equally compelling force as Tovey showed musical progress as
a forward-propelled process.
Musical degeneration is always based on an interpretative act. The
paradigmatic trajectory of organic process describes a succession of ger-
mination, flourishing and decay. Always interested in endings, degenera-
tion does not accept the period of decay as an inevitable part of this
trajectory but regards it as irreconcilable with the mantra of progress –
‘up and up and up, and on and on and on’47 – and treats it as the symptom
of a disease that has befallen the organism.
This idea of identifying a turning point beyond which history
cannot progress is at the heart of the discourse of musical degen-
eracy. No one has put this thought more concisely than the music
historian August Wilhelm Ambros, who was the first to assign the
composers of the ‘New German School’, Wagner and Liszt, a place in
history in 1860:
45 See Blindman 2002. 46 Pick 1989, 37–44. 47 Pick 1989, 13.
Figure 14.3 J. J. Grandville, ‘L’homme descend vers le brute’, Magasin pittoresque 14
(1843), p. 108.
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The direction of these artists memorably signifies the point toward which historical
evolution has movedmusic at large. Of course, excessive rigour in follow-up efforts
will lead to doom, and in any development there is a certain point, which is its
actual, true ‘point of life’, beyond which any further development turns into
degeneration, and will eventually fall into the abyss of aimlessness.48
The art of the music-historian-as-diagnostician was to identify this turning
point in history, when progress turns into degeneration, and to establish
criteria on the basis of which such pronouncements can be made author-
itatively. There was little dispute about the existence of such a turning
point, but it was much harder to gain consensus on the moment when this
turning point was reached – and why.
The basis on which this music is judged as degenerate (or, conversely, as
‘healthy’) is much more difficult to determine. Most arguments hark back
to a simpler age when, as in the eighteenth century, aesthetics could draw
on a sensus communis and a unified, authoritative notion of taste, and
before evolutionary thought introduced a stringent historical dimension
into musical thinking. Eighteenth-century aestheticians availed themselves
of a notion of ‘correct music’ that could become the normative basis of
judgment.49 In the nineteenth century, however, such consensus was much
harder to achieve, and democratic tendencies were often blamed for the
disintegration of taste. As a consequence, the rhetorical volume had to be
cranked up to retain an authoritative sense of unity in matters of taste.
For example, the respected Italian physiologist PaoloMantegazza turned
his medical authority to a blistering cultural critique in which he argued
that there can be no debate over matters of taste. For him, this was not a
question of opinion, taste, aesthetics or even physiology, but of plain
pathology:
Whoever loves the baroque and confuses it with the sublime, whoever seeks out the
grotesque and considers it to be great, whoever cannot separate the ornate from the
graceful, the common from the plain, the new from the beautiful – this person is a
degenerate, a mentally sick man, his aesthetic sense is diseased.50
This abject condemnation was brought about by the abomination of a
woman combining a green dress with a yellow scarf. With the benefit of
hindsight, the stern health warnings of Mantegazza and other men of
science can merely seem like a historical and hysterical curiosity, but we
do well not to dismiss these questionable pronouncements too lightly.
Learned men pronounced apparently eternal truths from the bully pulpit
48 Ambros 1860, 174. 49 See Hentschel 2006. 50 Mantegazza 1891, 135.
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of science in a world that appeared to be changing all too rapidly and to be
leaving behind any sense of stable common ground. For some, at any rate,
there was considerable comfort to be gained from hearing that there was an
absolute and non-negotiable line between good and bad, sublime and
baroque, ornate and graceful, or right and wrong – particularly if it was
couched in the clearly marked terms of sickness and health.
The danger of cultural degeneracy always lay in its contagious effects. Its
excess could hardly be contained and always threatened to spill over into
other areas: from music into noise, from one work into a whole historical
trajectory, and from sound into amorality. What was at stake was always
the stability of the (implied) definition of the good, true and beautiful. By
the late nineteenth century it was hardly possible to define these in positive
terms, but they could still be captured negatively – or so it seemed – as
degenerate deviations from these implied positives that would in this way
define and circumscribe that which was asserted to be self-evidently and
emphatically normal. But how would unassuming listeners protect them-
selves from the dangerous effects of such degenerate music?
Pathogenic Sonorities
The discourse of degeneracy is complicated by the fact that there is
another dimension cutting across the (quasi-)temporal axis of the evo-
lutionary models we just examined. The evolutionary chains are often
not merely to be read diachronically, as developmental chains that
unfold (and inescapably decline) over time, but also ‘in depth’. This
second axis is based on the belief that appearance can provide important
insights into underlying ethical qualities. We already saw this in the
invocation of Schiller’s artistic ideals, forging connections between
sounding surface and underlying morals. This idea of the unity of the
beautiful and the good – often called kalokagathia – was revived in the
eighteenth century, particularly by the Earl of Shaftesbury, and it was
eagerly adopted by other scholars, most famously the physiognomist
Johann Kaspar Lavater.
Physiognomy concerned itself with the interpretation of physical features in
terms of its relation to the underlying moral character. Lavater was well
known for another brand of developmental chains that bear some resem-
blance to the later evolutionary models of Haeckel and his colleagues, and no
less visually stunning than those, though they actually signified something
rather different. Take Lavater’s famous transformation from a frog to Apollo
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in Figure 14.4a, as an imagined spectrum from the very ugly to the epitome of
perfect beauty. These kinds of chains were closer in outlook to the medieval
scala naturae, the immutable hierarchy of the Great Chain of Being, than to
any evolutionary process, and they served as an illustration of the various
levels of moral standing that are attainable by various creatures.
In the context of a culture, however, that became obsessed with
evolutionary biology, or rather its popular reception, a parallel reading
of these images with the diachronic evolutionary tables was almost
invariably imposed. Grandville, for one, irreverently inverted the
image (Figure 14.4b), in exactly the same way he had prognosticated
Figure 14.4a Johann Kasper Lavater, Physiognomische Fragmente (1775–78), [Vom
Frosch zum Apollo Belvedere], Tables lxxviii/lxxix. Image used courtesy of
Bibliothèque nationale de France.
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the degenerative evolution from human to ape, suggesting a parallelism
between these two very different kinds of evolutions. By turning the
succession back to front, his caricature exposes the merely visual appeal
on which the supposed coherence hinges in such chains of images. And
of course, the discourse of degeneration conflated precisely the temporal
dimensions of evolution and the ‘depth’ dimension of an underlying
morality that could apparently be read out of anatomical features.
The circle around Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso, much-revered
dedicatee of Max Nordau’s Entartung, gained fame and notoriety for their
large-scale quantitative studies measuring facial features of criminals and
comparing them with those of law-abiding – emphatically ‘normal’ – citizens
in order to gauge whether physiological abnormalities could serve as
Figure 14.4a (cont.)
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predictors for socially abnormal and criminal behaviour. It would be wrong
to assume that the discourse of degeneration simply inverted the idea of
kalokagathia and posited that the ugly was coterminous with the morally
repugnant – things were never that straightforward. Rather, Lombroso sought
to prove that there is one model of anatomical normalcy and that any devia-
tions from this normal standard would signify underlying flaws of character.
A firm believer in the ontology-replicates-phylogeny parallelism, Lombroso
argued that anomalous physiological features were not markers of disease or
hereditary traits, but rather signs of ‘atavism,’ a regression to an earlier stage in
our evolutionary past.With the word ‘stigmata’, which Lombroso used to refer
to these physiological atavisms, he chose an etymologically correct but cultu-
rally loaded term.51 These stigmata linked modern humans with their devel-
opmental ancestors – and here the idea of ontogeny-replicates-phylogeny
allowed Lombroso to freely lump together apes, savages and children. As the
stigmata gave visible proof that these individuals had reverted to earlier
evolutionary – less civilised – stages, it seemed self-evident that they would
have regressed in their social behaviour as well. Following this logic, the
deviations from anatomical normalcy could thus help scientists to read an
innate propensity toward crime and antisocial behaviour out of the physiolo-
gical make-up of individuals afflicted with such stigmata. In the words of
Stephen Jay Gould, Lombroso’s ‘born criminal pursues his destructive ways
because he is, literally, a savage in our midst – and we can recognise him
because he carries the morphological signs of an apish past’.52
Figure 14.4b J. J. Grandville, [L’homme descend vers la grenouille], Magasin
pittoresque 15 (1844), p. 272.
51 Lombroso 2006. 52 Gould 1977, 120.
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In the field of music, especially non-representational music, the connec-
tions between moral comportment, anatomy and heredity were somewhat
less straightforward – largely because the double notion of music ‘as life’
and ‘representing life’ made concepts of evolution and heredity more
complicated. Only few musicians made attempts to transfer an explicit
notion of ‘atavism’ to the realm of music history.53 But this did not deter
scholars from observing the musical surface very closely to get a clearer
view of what lurked behind it.
***
What had been conceptualised in the evolutionary models as a process
of decline unfolding in the diachronic domain was being reconfigured in
this discourse into the synchronic dimension of depth and surface.
Criticism was expected to look behind the sounding surface and to
penetrate the deep structure of the musical work. In Kurth’s immortal
words: ‘The gaze into music is veiled by sounds.’54 The ‘correctness’ of
the music was judged according to that which did not simply meet the
ear.
The idea that composers were fascinated by the surface of music, which
would somehow constitute a danger, was widespread among fin-de-siècle
music critics and aestheticians. The general consensus was that a focus on
the surface, a process of externalisation, obscured the deep structure of the
music and, more broadly, that the sensuous features of music might take
over from the deep intellectual pursuit that characterised particularly the
tradition of instrumental music.55
Even where there was no explicit concept of a Schenkerian Ursatz,
musical and cultural critics saw certain dangers emanating from too
much focus on the sounding surface. The sensuous dimension of
orchestration, which had stubbornly resisted structural analysis
throughout the nineteenth century, was a central concern in this
respect. The idea that instrumental timbre might be used to paper
over structural flaws was widely accepted. Kurth, the first music theorist
to analyse Strauss’s Salome, argued that ‘considerable mollification of
the harshnesses [of harmonic clashes] is always found in the
instrumentation’.56
Some critics saw a genuine threat emanating from instrumental
sounds:
53 See for instance, Koller 1901, 42. 54 Kurth 1920, 3. 55 See Watkins 2011.
56 Kurth 1920, 136.
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The study of instrumental sounds belongs in the chapter of musical stimuli, that is,
based on their effects on the nervous system. This can, under certain circum-
stances, attain a degree that the stimulus becomes pathological. In more recent
times especially, pathological stimuli play a major part in music, and there is many
an artist who works with instrumentation almost exclusively.57
Some critics prescribed sonically ‘neutral’ piano arrangements to spare
overly sensitive nerves. In this line of thought, the purest music is silence,
unencumbered by sounds.
The idea that instrumental sounds are somehow ‘pathological’ resonated
with music critics of the earlier nineteenth century, and was famously
highlighted by Eduard Hanslick.58 ‘Pathological’ listening wallows in
sounds and excites the nerves. He set up his own strategy of formal
appreciation of musical works in sharp opposition to the ‘pathological
listening’ which reacted to the glittering acoustical surface of musical
works, ignoring the underlying structural features. Hanslick’s example
shows as well that the criticism of ‘pathological’ music is not only focused
on the relationship between the genius composer and musical evolution,
but expands the circle of influence to the relationship between music and
listener.
***
The term ‘pathological’ is not randomly chosen: it allows, on the one hand,
a connection to the scientific advances of musical perception, and on the
other, it raises the frightful possibility of music no longer appealing to
traditional ‘ethos’ (character), but instead attaching itself to ‘pathos’
(experience).59 In other words, music would no longer be a spiritual
force, as especially idealists had demanded, but rather a force that worked
directly on the body.
In the final analysis, the squeamishness about the sensuous surface of
music leads us back down the road to sensuousness and eroticism. The
attitude of the Victorian period toward sexuality is famously complex.
The Darwinian line that was promoted in certain circles about the func-
tion of music in sexual selection did not help those who felt uncomfort-
able with the sensuous dimension of music. Darwin himself had
57 Schaeffer 1877, 8.
58 For instance, in his Vorlesungen über Musik (1826), Hans Georg Nägeli suggests performing
symphonies as piano duets to prevent sensual stimuli from impinging too much on the
perception of music. See Sponheuer 1987, 173.
59 See, for instance, Painter 1995, 238.
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suggested, based on his speculations on birdsong, that music was an
important part of rituals of sexual attraction. Koller, the most outspoken
Darwinian among the musicologists, applied this idea more rigorously
than anyone:
In the competition for females it is not only the strongest males that remain
victorious but also those that stand out over and above all other competitors on
account of exceptionally decorative colours, plumage, song, etc. The parallel in
music, it seems, is the observation that here, too, the splendour of the exterior
means of expression, in the form of virtuosity, catchy instrumentation, new
surprising effects, etc. is continuously augmented and intensified.60
Koller argued that this principle of ‘sexual selection’ in the musical domain
was responsible for a natural tendency toward progressively coarsening
audience tastes. But here Koller followed Spencer rather than Darwin:
according to the latter’s musical rule of the ‘survival of the fittest’, compo-
sitions lacking in splendour and appeal would ‘die out’ by no longer
gaining favour with audiences and eventually not being performed.
Koller came close to naturalising market capitalism in the concert hall.
His cheerful Spencerianism is perhaps an indication of anti-elitist, demo-
cratic tendencies inherent in his thought. How valid these are in practice is
another question, as Koller seems to imagine audiences as unsusceptible to
manipulation. However, his optimism seems wilfully to repress a problem
that loomed large in more pessimistic commentators’minds: the lowering
of standards to please audiences, in the service of a musical kind of sexual
selection. More sensual music leads down the road of immediate sensual
effects without reflection.
In this respect, Strauss’s orchestral technique was deemed particularly
suspicious, as it threatened to supplant the intelligibility of the formal
aspects of his music. For one critic, this has grave consequences:
The iridescent beauty of the orchestra is admirable but its incapability of creating a
single fully shaped musical idea from this chaos of colours is deplorable . . . The
only thing we do not get is redeeming melody, redeeming music. From the rotting
vaults of the drama this shapeless windy music blows up dust and dirt that cause
the listener to suffocate.61
As seen before, beauty – and any ensuing ethical qualities – are bound up
with form. Strauss’s orchestral counterpoint particularly arouses
suspicion:
60 Koller 1901, 48. 61 Gräner 1905, 438.
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The reckless brutalities of the contrapuntal voice-leading, in strange opposition to
the refined, sophisticated instrumentation, the contorted progressions, the fre-
quent use of melodically vacuous passages and trills, the merely external, sensual,
splendid [but] screaming orchestral colours: all these feature in Strauss’s composi-
tions bear witness to a disturbed psychological state, which has lost a sense of the
true beauty of clear, pure form and controlled power within bounds.62
Other critics harboured the same fears that counterpoint and orchestration
might team up against musical form. Some responded by charging ahead
and denying Strauss any artistic qualities:
This kind of contrapuntal work is child’s play. The fact that Strauss immediately
becomes banal whenever, for the sake of contrast, he works without it, confirms the
suspicion that this bold technique is only needed, out of embarrassment, as a
shroud to cover up his lack of invention.63
Even though Strauss’s technique was supposedly mere child’s play, it took
another seven years before anyone seriously engaged analytically with the
music. Kurth provided the theoretical framework in which harmony,
counterpoint and orchestration were brought together in forever histori-
cally changing constellations.
Kurth’s concept of ‘disalteration’ suggests that a pitch in a triad is
chromatically altered in two different ways simultaneously. From this
perspective, shown in Figure 14.5, the opening gesture, with the sweeping
clarinet run over a non-standard exoticist scale, becomes a simple C♮-
minor plagal cadence, with the F♮-minor subdominant disaltered to com-
prise D and C♮. It sounds like a non-functional dominant-seventh chord in
second inversion but its actual function would be veiled by this disaltera-
tion. Likewise, bar 3 becomes a sustained C♮-minor chord with a doubly-
altered fifth (A and G♮). By this means, Kurth’s analysis lifts ‘the shroud
that covers up’ the opening passage.
Kurth recognised that disalteration bore within it the seed of the destruc-
tion of tonality. In themost extreme case, from Schoenberg’sHarmonielehre,
a dominant ninth chord can simply be ‘disaltered’ into a whole-note scale.
Kurth explored how disaltered chords shift the focus away from harmonies
towards voice-leading, from the vertical to the horizontal dimension. The
voice-leading from disaltered chord to disaltered chord was often associated
with harsh clashes but, as Kurth assured his readers, these contrapuntal
harshnesses were mollified by means of orchestration. Put more ominously,
Strauss’s luscious, beguiling orchestration would function as the veil that
62 Gräner 1905, 436–7. 63 Göhler, ‘Richard Strauß’, in Shigihara 1990, 216.
Unsound Seeds 329
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316275863.015
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Cambridge Centre of International Studies, on 10 Oct 2021 at 14:50:06, subject to the Cambridge
rendered inaudible the degeneration that had found its way into the harmo-
nic and contrapuntal structures of his music.
***
We cannot know whether Kurth’s principle of ‘disalteration’ in fact offered
the music-theoretical representation, the technical basis of degeneration,
that the critics in the wake of Draeseke’s polemic had imagined, or indeed
whether his notion of ‘disalteration’ is really the altered gene that causes the
musical embryo to go astray from form, beauty and morality. Kurth
refrained from engaging in the kind of cultural criticism that had sur-
rounded the opera just a few years previously. (Schoenberg’s extended
tonality, by contrast, was regarded as another harbinger of doom.)
However, Kurth’s explanations do provide a model that goes a long way
Figure 14.5 Ernst Kurth’s analysis of the opening bars of Salome, from Die
Voraussetzungen der theoretischen Harmonik (1913), p. 138.
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to tying together various threads (or threats) that were articulated some-
what sketchily in the responses to Strauss’s Salome. Kurth’s developmental
history of musical parameters – which, significantly, was devoid of any of
the pessimistic outlook that characterised the critical discourse around
Salome – helps us understand why Strauss’s rich orchestration and his
programmatic proclivities were regarded with such horror in the critical
context of organicism. Put polemically, if skilful orchestration could func-
tion as a shroud to cover up the underlying decaying structure, if the
limitations set by nature could thus be surreptitiously expanded, then
music might be in a worse state thanmeets the eye: the fear of degeneration
reveals itself in the last instance as a formalist fear of sound.
This fear of sonic phenomena, of appearances, may be reflected on the
various veils, shrouds and curtains that pervade both the opera and the
critical language in which it is, well, clothed. Cultural historian Aleida
Assmann reminds us that veils and curtains essentially fulfil the same
function: both can conceal and reveal a secret.64 In that sense, the opening
few bars representing the rising curtain are no less revelatory than the
sexual core of the opera, Salome’s dance of the seven veils. Both harbour
secrets that ought not to be revealed.
Or do they? Is it not the veil, the curtain, that only makes the secret?
What matters is the concealment giving rise to our expectations of a
revelation, more so than the object that is to be revealed. To return to the
image with which we started, the advisories andwarning signs serve to alert
us to some monstrosity that is to follow, and that we might otherwise not
even have noted. From this angle, the critics’ real fear turns out to be the
(no less monstrous) situation where the lifted veil reveals that nothing had
been hidden in the first place.
In the critical discourse around Draeseke’s polemic, however, the veil
had been turned into the antiseptic linens of the hospital bed to which the
patient modern music had been confined.With its belief in organicism and
a normative notion of beauty, the concept of degeneracy mainly served to
identify the musical object in negative terms: Salome emerges as the
product of a misguided musical progress, the parameters of which are
defined by its deviation from the purportedly natural limitations. The
diagnosis of musical degeneration in Salome is a reconstruction of an
elusive idea of what might constitute ‘healthy music’. This diagnosis is
premised on a self-evident understanding of healthy music. It is only an
64 Assmann 1997.
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apparent paradox that this interest in ‘healthy music’ emerged at precisely
the time when Salome was pronounced irrecoverably sick.
Only outside of this heated polemical context was it possible to take a
broader stance on the meaning of degeneration, the ‘dark side of progress’,
as a necessary by-product of the nineteenth-century ideology of progress.65
The Edinburgh Review, surveying the recent philosophical literature on the
topic, observed sagely: ‘Degeneration is a necessary accompaniment of
progress. We must look upon it with no teleological disfavour but as a
normal manifestation of evolutionary change, set up in response to envir-
onmental conditions.’66
The contentious case of Strauss’s Salome clearly shows the stakes: in the
relentless forward surge of progress and the transcendental homelessness
that characterised the modern condition, it became more important than
ever to assert stability and control over a world that had apparently lost any
sense of stable values. By emphatically excluding artworks such as Salome,
by branding them with the Cain’s mark of degeneracy, cultural critics
asserted their authority in demarcating a space for ‘normality’ – though
couched in the unassailable scientific metaphors of ‘health’ and ‘nature’ –
to give them a sense of the cultural stability that they so sorely lacked.
Hearing the End
In Der Fall Wagner Nietzsche interpolated a proclamation in French,
‘Wagner est une névrose.’ He could expect his educated contemporaries
to hear the resonances: the French psychiatrist Moreau de Tours had made
a similarly terse pronouncement: ‘Le génie est une névrose.’67 For Moreau,
madness and genius were congeneric, ‘in radice convenient’.68 This judg-
ment was eagerly picked up all over Europe: the psychological literature on
the genius at the turn of the century was legion. But what exactly does it
mean when genius and madman ‘come together at the root’? Obviously,
the common ground between genius and the madman lay in the deviation
from the norm: both had a penchant for thinking ‘outside the box’, and this
could lead to culturally useful results in the case of the one or not, in the
case of the other. Beyond that, there was no agreement on how to relate
degeneracy and genius. For every Lombroso, arguing that madmen and
65 Chamberlin and Gilman 1985. 66 [unsigned] 1911a, 138–64.
67 Moreau 1859, 464. This statement was eagerly taken up and quoted by Lombroso.
68 Moreau 1859, 493.
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geniuses were closely related, there was a Nordau, who pronounced them
irreconcilably opposed.
The two positions reflected their own underlying biases. Lombroso’s
examination always began with the physiology of the creator, showing
large overlaps between the insane and the genius.69 He saw non-causal
parallels between ‘healthy geniuses’, ‘insane geniuses’ and the ‘insane with-
out any special gifts’. To Nordau, however, that there might be any form of
overlap of these groups was anathema. Analysing cultural creations to infer
the mental state of their creators would simply not allow for such a
possibility.
It was common in psychologists’ circles to analyse the creative artworks
of their patients and to examine them for clues as to their psychic make-up.
But in a world where the creations flowing from the geniuses’ nibs develop
a life of their own and affect the world around them, the stakes are
particularly high. The logic of musical degeneracy posited a closed circle:
‘A lack of chastity in artistic creation will always be avenged by diseases of
the art, which have a dangerous effect back on the artist.’70 What exactly
these ‘diseases of the art’ are and how exactly they afflict their environment
remained unclear; the boundary between metaphor and reality remained
tantalisingly undefined.
In its ill-defined boundaries, however, degeneracy in music could hardly
be contained: music affected health and sickness of individuals in myster-
ious ways, as it did society at large. There is no distinction between
individual and collective (whether it be identified biologically as race or
sociologically as community), though given the strong organicist overtones
of the discourse of degeneracy, these conflations should come as no
surprise. The burden was firmly on the composers. Musing on the agency
of the individual composer, Adler underlined: ‘Every being carries the
germ of decay in him, and the greatest deed of a human is not seldom
the cause of his fall.’71 Pure organicist lore, this rule has little to do with
biology or evolution – or with history, for that matter. It is nothing other
than Aristotle’s harmartia, the ‘fatal flaw’ of the tragic hero.
As we saw, the laws of degeneration are invariably the laws of literature;
its fears are based on the poetic justice that its practitioners fear the real
world has denied them. No wonder that listening to Salome on the radio
motivates a character in Alfred Döblin’s novelHamlet to move to Paris and
to degrade into prostitution. No wonder that George Du Maurier’s wholly
unmusical Trilby, whose singing enchants her fawning audiences as
69 See Lombroso 1864 and especially 1894. 70 Raff 1854, 183. 71 Adler 1911, 28.
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Svengali extends his dark powers over her, became the best-selling novel of
the 1890s. No wonder that it is the self-absorbed twins of Thomas Mann’s
Wälsungenblut, like those of Elimir Bourges’s Crépuscules des Dieux, who
are inspired by Wagner’s music to consummate incest as an act of higher
purity.
Despite all the cultural fear-mongering, in real life music has never
effected such moral decrepitude. The discourse of degeneration adopts
the persona and the authority of the scientist, and puts him (there is little
ambiguity about the gender) in power over the narrative. He decides when
the story is over and how it ends – as long as he abides by the rules of poetic
justice. As a man of science, who can get below the sounding surface, he is
in a position to tell us what the rest of us cannot hear but which may be of
baleful influence to the rest of us. And as a poetic figure, his stories will
always follow the same moralising archetypes, asserting order over a world
that has become complicated and unstable. He tells us, in categorical terms
that allow no objections, how to separate right from wrong, beautiful from
ugly, healthy from unhealthy. Audiences at the time would ignore these
health warnings at their own peril. What the frightened – and titillated –
public rarely realised was that those pronouncements were, in the most
literal of senses, works of science fiction.
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